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THE COLLECTIVE MODEL OF HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION:
A NONPARAMETRIC CHARACTERIZATION
BY LAURENS CHERCHYE,B RAM DE ROCK, AND FREDERIC VERMEULEN1
We provide a nonparametric characterization of a general collective model for
household consumption, which includes externalities and public consumption. Next, we
establishtestablenecessaryandsufﬁcientconditionsfordataconsistencywithcollective
rationality that only include observed price and quantity information. These conditions
have a similar structure as the generalized axiom of revealed preference for the uni-
tary model, which is convenient from a testing point of view. In addition, we derive the
minimum number of goods and observations that enable the rejection of collectively
rational household behavior.
KEYWORDS: Collective household models, intrahousehold allocation, revealed pref-
erences, nonparametric analysis.
1. INTRODUCTION
TRADITIONALLY, HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION BEHAVIOR is crammed into the
so-called unitary approach, which assumes that a household acts as if it were
a single decision maker; it maximizes a well behaved (single) utility function
subject to a household budget constraint. The collective model, which was ﬁrst
presented by Chiappori (1988, 1992), differs from the unitary model in that it
explicitly recognizes that the individual household members have own, possibly
diverging, rational preferences. These individuals are assumed to engage in a
bargaining process that results in a Pareto efﬁcient intrahousehold allocation.
Browning and Chiappori (1998) provided a characterization of a general col-
lective model. They start from the “minimalistic” assumptions that the empir-
ical analyst cannot determine which goods are privately and/or publicly con-
sumed within the household, and that the quantities that are privately con-
sumed by the different household members cannot be observed. In addition,
they considered general individual preferences that allow for altruism and
other externalities. Their core result for two-person households is that under
collectively rational household behavior the pseudo-Slutsky matrix can be writ-
ten as the sum of a symmetric negative semideﬁnite matrix and a rank 1 ma-
trix. Browning and Chiappori showed necessity of this condition; Chiappori
and Ekeland (2006) addressed the associated sufﬁciency question.
1We are grateful to a co-editor, three anonymous referees, Denis Beninger, Geert Dhaene,
and Olivier Donni for helpful comments and suggestions, which substantially improved the pa-
per. We also thank seminar participants in Leuven, Mannheim, Paris, Tilburg, Turin, and the
Econometric Society World Congress 2005 in London for useful discussions. Finally, we want
to thank Martin Browning for inspiring conversations, which formed an important motivation
for this study. The usual disclaimer applies. Frederic Vermeulen acknowledges the ﬁnancial sup-
port provided through the European Community’s Human Potential Programme under contract
HPRN-CT-2002-00235 (AGE).
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Browning and Chiappori focused on a so-called parametric setting, which re-
quires some (nonveriﬁable) functional structure that is imposed on the house-
hold decision process (i.e., the household members’ preferences and the intra-
household bargaining process). In this paper, we follow a nonparametric ap-
proach, which analyzes household behavior without imposing any parametric
structure on, for example, preferences; see Afriat (1967), Varian (1982), and,
more recently, Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2003). This nonparametric
approach was ﬁrst adapted to the collective model by Chiappori (1988), who
restricted attention to a labor supply setting that involves a number of conve-
nient simpliﬁcations for the empirical analyst (e.g., observability of household
members’ leisure/labor supply and no public consumption).
We aim to generalize Chiappori’s work by providing a nonparametric char-
acterization of the collective consumption model of Browning and Chiappori,
which includes both public consumption and (in casu positive) externalities.
In Section 2, we derive necessary and sufﬁcient nonparametric conditions for
data consistency with this general model. As we will discuss, these conditions
imply unobservable (household member-speciﬁc) quantity and price informa-
tion. In Sections 3 and 4, we subsequently establish necessary and sufﬁcient
conditions that only require observed prices and aggregate household quan-
tities. Interestingly, this implies nonparametric tests for collective rationality
that are ﬁnite in nature and do not require ﬁnding a solution to a system of
(nonlinear) inequalities.2 As a by-product, we derive the minimum number of
goods and observations that enable rejection of collective rationality. Section 5
contains some concluding remarks. The Appendix contains the proofs of our
results, and presents (ﬁnite) testing algorithms for the necessary and sufﬁcient
collective rationality conditions that are expressed in terms of observed prices
and quantities.
2. A CHARACTERIZATION OF COLLECTIVE RATIONALITY FOR
TWO-PERSON HOUSEHOLDS
We consider a two-member (1 and 2) household. (Generalizations for
M-member households are found in Sections 1–3 of Cherchye, De Rock, and
Vermeulen (2007).) The household purchases the (nonzero) n-vector of quan-
tities q ∈  n
+ with corresponding prices p ∈  n
++. All goods can be consumed
privately, publicly, or both. Generally, we have q = q1 + q2 + qh for q the (ob-
2We see at least two important differences between our approach and that of Snyder (2000),
who addresses a similar research question for Chiappori’s (1988) original labor supply model.
First, Snyder focuses on a more restricted model that includes egoistic agents and observable
leisure. Second, we do not make use of semialgebraic theory for quantiﬁer elimination. A well
known limitation of these latter techniques is that they become computationally cumbersome
for large data sets. For example, Snyder restricts to settings of only two observations, while we
consider the general case of T observations.COLLECTIVE HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION 555
served) aggregate quantities, q1 and q2 the (unobserved) private quantities of
each household member, and qh the (unobserved) public quantities.
Following Browning and Chiappori (1998), we consider general preferences
for the household members that may depend not only on the own private and
public quantities, but also (positively) on the other individual’s private quan-
tities; this allows for altruism and/or externalities.3 Formally, this means that
the preferences of each household member m (m = 1 2) can be represented
by a utility function of the form Um(q1 q2 qh) that is nondecreasing in its ar-
guments q1, q2,a n dqh. Throughout, we focus on nonsatiated utility functions.
Suppose T observations of the household. For each observation j we use pj
and qj to denote the (observed) aggregate prices and quantities, respectively,
while S ={ (pj;qj);j = 1     T} represents the set of observations. For ob-
served aggregate quantities qj,w ed e ﬁ n efeasible personalized quantities qj as




















j = qj  (2.1)
Each  qj captures a feasible decomposition of the aggregate quantities qj into
private quantities (q1
j and q2
j) and public quantities (qh
j ). One possible speciﬁ-
cation of these personalized quantities q1
j, q2
j,a n dqh




j , but, of course, these latter quantities are not observed. Using this
concept, we can now deﬁne the condition for a collective rationalization of a
set of observations S.
DEFINITION 1: Let S ={ (pj;qj);j = 1     T} be a set of observations.
A pair of utility functions U1 and U2 provides a collective rationalization
of S if for each observation j there exist feasible personalized quantities
 qj = (q1
j q2
j qh
j) and µj ∈  ++ such that
U
1( qj)+µjU
2( qj) ≥ U
1( z)+µjU
2( z)
for all z = (z1 z2 zh) with z1 z2 zh ∈  n
+ and p 
j(z1 +z2 +zh) ≤ p 
jqj.
Thus, a collective rationalization of S requires that there exist, for each ob-
servation j, feasible personalized quantities  qj that maximize a weighted sum
3ThissettinggeneralizesChiappori’s(1988)altruisticmodelintwoways:itdoesnotassumethe
observability of private and/or public consumption of any good, and it allows for public consump-
tion. Admittedly, the assumption of positive externalities, which is not needed in a parametric
setting (see Browning and Chiappori (1998)), may be restrictive in some instances. However, its
restrictive nature should not be overestimated. Even though a negative externality may be associ-
ated with, for example, tobacco consumption, the nonsmoker’s positive valuation of the smoker’s
utility generated by smoking might well outweigh that negative externality. In addition, within-
household mechanisms may be instituted that decrease or even eliminate the negative external-
ities; see, for example, the widespread practice of smoking outside in households that consist of
smokers as well as nonsmokers.556 L. CHERCHYE, B. DE ROCK, AND F. VERMEULEN
of household member utilities U1 and U2 for the given household budget p 
jqj.
This optimality condition reﬂects the Pareto efﬁciency assumption regarding
observed household consumption in the collective model. Each weight µj rep-
resents the “bargaining power” of the household members for observation j;
see Browning and Chiappori (1998) for a detailed discussion.
In view of our further exposition, it is interesting to compare the collective
rationality condition in Deﬁnition 1 with the standard unitary rationality condi-
tion. According to Varian’s (1982, p. 946) deﬁnition, a unitary rationalization of




j = 0)foreachobservation j.4 Inthatpresentation,uni-
tary rationalization boils down to collective rationalization with one household
member (in casu member 1) as the “dictator” in the household. This interpre-
tation of the unitary model as a dictatorship model will return in our discussion
in Section 4.
Before presenting nonparametric conditions for a collective rationalization,
it is useful to brieﬂy recapture the nonparametric conditions for a unitary ra-
tionalization. To do so, we deﬁne two relationships that will be used in the
following discussion.
DEFINITION 2: For a set of observations S ={ (pj;qj);j = 1     T}:i fp 
iqi ≥
p 
iqj, then qiR0qj,a n di fqiR0qk qkR0ql     qzR0qj for some (possibly empty)
sequence (k l     z), then qiRqj.
In the unitary model, R0 is commonly referred to as the direct revealed pref-
erence relation, while its transitive closure R is known as the revealed preference
relation. Using Deﬁnition 2, we can deﬁne the generalized axiom of revealed
preference (GARP).
DEFINITION 3: A set of observations S ={ (pj;qj);j = 1     T} satisﬁes
GARP if p 
jqj ≤ p 
jqi whenever qiRqj.
Varian (1982) demonstrated that a unitary rationalization of a set of obser-
vations S is possible if and only if S satisﬁes the GARP. The GARP provides
the basis for a test of data consistency with the unitary model. Essentially, this
test proceeds in two steps: one ﬁrst recovers the relations R0 and R, and then
4Strictly speaking, µj = 0 is excluded in Deﬁnition 1. As for that deﬁnition, we note that the
requirement µj ∈  ++ pertains to the Pareto efﬁciency interpretation of household consump-
tion, which is, of course, irrelevant if there is only one (dictator) household member. In fact, it
can be shown that unitary rationality requires a collective rationalization for µj constant over all
observations j, but we prefer the dictatorship interpretation of the unitary model in view of our
following discussion. [Compare with Browning and Chiappori (1998); see also Browning, Chiap-
pori, and Lechene (2006).] Furthermore, the fact that we can use q1
j = qj to obtain the unitary
rationalization condition illustrates that the distinction between public and private consumption
becomes irrelevant in the unitary model; this contrasts with the collective model.COLLECTIVE HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION 557
subsequently checks the upper cost bound condition in Deﬁnition 3.T h i st w o -
step structure will return in the collective rationality condition that we present
in the next section.
Using Deﬁnitions 2 and 3, we can now establish nonparametric conditions
for a collective rationalization of a set S. To do so, we ﬁrst deﬁne feasible per-
sonalized prices ( p1
j  p2









j) and  p
2

















j ≤ pj (c = 1 2 h) 
This concept complements the concept of feasible personalized quantities
in (2.1): p1
j and p2
j capture the fraction of the price for the personalized quan-
tities  qj that is borne by, respectively, member 1 and member 2; p1
j and p2
j
pertain to private quantities and ph
j pertains to public quantities.5 Based on
(2.1)a n d( 2.2), we deﬁne a set of feasible personalized prices and quantities




j; qj);j = 1     T}  (2.3)
We then have the following result.
PROPOSITION 1: Let S ={ (pj;qj);j = 1     T} be a set of observations. The
following conditions are equivalent:
(i) There exists a pair of concave and continuous utility functions U1 and U2
that provide a collective rationalization of S.
(ii) There exists a set of feasible personalized prices and quantities  S such that
the sets {( p1
j; qj);j = 1     T} and {( p2
j; qj);j = 1     T} both satisfy GARP.
(iii) There exists a set of feasible personalized prices and quantities  S  numbers
Um
j > 0 and λm









j) ( qi − qj).
The nonparametric conditions (ii) and (iii) have a structure similar to the
unitary model; see Varian (1982) for an extensive discussion of the nonpara-
metric requirements for unitary rationalization. The essential difference is that
the conditions for collective rationalization are expressed in terms of a set of
feasible personalized prices and quantities  S. For a given speciﬁcation of this
set, Proposition 1 states nonparametric conditions at the level of the household
members 1 and 2 that are analogous to the unitary rationalization conditions at
the level of the aggregate household. Contrary to the unitary case, the true per-
sonalized prices and quantities are unobserved. Therefore, it is only imposed
that there must exist at least one  S that satisﬁes the conditions.
5It is easily veriﬁed that ( p1
j + p2
j)  qi = p 
jqi for any i and j.558 L. CHERCHYE, B. DE ROCK, AND F. VERMEULEN
A ﬁnal note pertains to the interpretation of the nonparametric conditions
in Proposition 1. Following Chiappori (1988), we can interpret the different
goods as “public” goods, given that they all enter both members’ utility func-
tions. In that interpretation, the personalized prices ( p1
j  p2
j) may be under-
stood as Lindahl prices: they must add up (over members 1 and 2) to the ob-
served market prices so as to be consistent with Pareto efﬁciency. Thus, no
qualitative distinction should be made between public and private quantities
(where private quantities may be associated with externalities). Yet, there is
a clear quantitative difference: household members may accord another mar-
ginal valuation to private consumption than to public consumption.
3. TESTABLE NECESSITY RESTRICTIONS
The (necessary and sufﬁcient) conditions for a collective rationalization in
Proposition 1 can be difﬁcult to use in practice, because they are nonlinear in
terms of feasible personalized prices ( p1
j  p2
j) and quantities qj;s e e ,f o re x a m -
ple, Watson, Bartholomew-Biggs, and Ford (2000) for a discussion of similar
nonlinearity problems. In what follows we present testable conditions for col-
lective rationality that solely use (observed) aggregate prices pj and quantities
qj. This section develops a necessary condition for a collective rationalization
of a set of observations S that has a two-step structure similar to the unitary
GARP (see our discussion following Deﬁnition 3). The next section presents
the complementary sufﬁciency condition.
We ﬁrst deﬁne the analogues of the relations R0 and R for members 1 and 2
in the collective model.
DEFINITION 4: Let  S ={ ( p1
j  p2
j; qj);j = 1     T} be a set of feasible per-
sonalized prices and quantities. Then for m = 1 2: if ( pm
i )  qi ≥ ( pm





0 qk  qkR
m
0 ql      qzR
m
0 qj forsome(possiblyempty)sequence
(k l     z), then qiRm qj.
Of course, different speciﬁcations of the set  S generally imply different rela-
tions R
m
0 and Rm. To establish our testable necessary condition for collectively
rational behavior, we derive restrictions on the relations R
m
0 and Rm without
reference to a speciﬁc  S. In this respect, the next lemma speciﬁes a useful re-
lationship between R
m
0 and R0, which is deﬁned in terms of the set of observa-
tions S.
LEMMA 1: Let S ={ (pj;qj);j = 1     T} be a set of observations. We have
qiR0qj if and only if, for all sets  S of feasible personalized prices and quantities,
 qiR1
0 qj or qiR2
0 qj.
The intuition of this result pertains to the Pareto efﬁcient nature of house-
hold behavior in the collective model. Speciﬁcally, if the household has cho-
sen qi when qj was equally available (i.e., qiR0qj, which means p 
iqi ≥ p 
iqj),COLLECTIVE HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION 559
then we always have that, independently of the speciﬁcation of the set  S, at least
one household member must prefer the former (personalized) quantities to
the latter (i.e., qiR1
0 qj or qiR2
0 qj). As a result, if we want to avoid selecting spe-
ciﬁc feasible personalized prices and quantities (because we lack information
to do so), then we can start from the relation R0 for specifying restrictions on
the relations R1
0 and R2
0. Moreover, the equivalence result in Lemma 1 implies
that we cannot do better when using only the set of observations S (rather than
some  S).
Lemma 1 provides the starting point for our testable necessity condition for
collective rationality. We sketch the basic intuition of that condition by means
of the next simple example.
EXAMPLE 1: Consider the case of three observations and three goods with
prices and quantities
q1 = (821 )
   q2 = (218 )
   q3 = (182 )
 ;
p1 = (521 )
   p2 = (215 )
   p3 = (152 )
  














so that for all observations i j ∈{ 1 2 3} we have qiR0qj. Using Lemma 1,w e
therefore conclude
∀i j ∈{ 1 2 3}   qiR
1
0 qj or  qiR
2
0 qj  (3.1)





0 q2  q2R
1
0 q3 and  q3R
2
0 q2  q2R
2
0 q1  (3.2)
Intuitively, this speciﬁcation means that member 1 prefers (personalized)  q1
over q2 while member 2 prefers q3 over q2. In that case, the choice of the (ag-
gregate) quantities q2 can be rationalized only if it is not more expensive than
the sum of q1 and q3  which requires that p 
2q2 ≤ p 
2(q1 + q3).H o w e v e r ,t h i si s
inconsistent with p 
2q2 > p 
2(q1 + q3). Because the same argument can be re-
peated for any other possible speciﬁcation of the relations R1
0 and R2
0 instead
of (3.2), we conclude that a collective rationalization of this set of observations
is impossible.6
6At this point, it is important that we can exclude for all i j ∈{ 1 2 3} with i  = j:  qiR1
0 qj and
 qiR2
0 qj. Intuitively, the latter speciﬁcation of the relations R1
0 and R2
0 means that both members
1a n d2p r e f e r( p e r s o n a l i z e d ) qi over  qj. In that case, the choice of (aggregate) qj can be ratio-
nalized only if it is not more expensive than qi, which is inconsistent with p 
jqj > p 
jqi.T h ef o r m a l
argument is based on Lemma 2 (rule (iv)).560 L. CHERCHYE, B. DE ROCK, AND F. VERMEULEN
The basic structure of the collective rationalization test in this example par-
allels the two-step structure of the unitary GARP test. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst
speciﬁed the relations R1
0 and R2
0 in (3.2), and subsequently veriﬁed the corre-
sponding upper cost bound condition (in casu p 
2q2 ≤ p 
2(q1 +q3)), which is not
met for this particular set of observations.
To generalize these ideas, we ﬁrst specify some further restrictions that must
hold if a collective rationalization of the set of observations S is possible in
terms of Proposition 1. In that case, there exists a set of feasible personalized
prices and quantities  S such that the corresponding R1
0 and R2
0 satisfy the fol-
lowing conditions in relation to their transitive closures R1 and R2, aggregate
prices pj, and quantities qj:
LEMMA 2: Suppose that there exists a pair of utility functions U1 and U2 that
provide a collective rationalization of the set of observations S ={ (pj;qj);j =
1     T}. Then there exists a set of feasible personalized prices and quantities  S
that deﬁnes the relations R
m
0 and Rm for each member m ∈{ 1 2} such that:
(i) if p 
iqi ≥ p 
iqj and qjRm qi, then qiR
l
0 qj (with m  = l);
(ii) if p 
iqi ≥ p 
i(qj1 +qj2) and qj1Rm qi, then qiR
l
0 qj2 (with m  = l);
(iii) if qi1R1 qj and qi2R2 qj, then p 
jqj ≤ p 
j(qi1 +qi2);
(iv) if qiR1 qj and qiR2 qj, then p 
jqj ≤ p 
jqi.
The interpretation of this result pertains to the very nature of the collec-
tive model, which—recall—explicitly recognizes the multiperson nature of the
household decision process. More speciﬁcally, the four rules in Lemma 2 relate
to rationality across household members for a given speciﬁcation of the feasible
personalized prices and quantities. First, rule (i) expresses that if member m
prefers (personalized) qj over qi for (aggregate) qj not more expensive than qi,
then the choice of qi can be rationalized only if the other member l prefers qi
over  qj. Next, the meaning of rule (ii) is that if (aggregate) qi is more expen-
sive than the sum of qj1 and qj2, while member m prefers (personalized)  qj1
over  qi, then the only possibility for rationalizing the choice of qi is that the
other member l prefers qi over qj2.
Rules (i) and (ii) deﬁne restrictions on the relations R
m
0 and Rm. For a spec-
iﬁcation of these relations, rules (iii) and (iv) deﬁne the corresponding up-
per cost bound conditions. First, rule (iii) complements rule (ii): if members
1 and 2 prefer, respectively, (personalized) qi1 and qi2 over qj, then the choice
of (aggregate) qj can be rationalized only if it is not more expensive than the
sum of qi1 and qi2. Finally, rule (iv) considers the special case where both mem-
bers prefer the same (personalized) quantities qi over qj, in which case, under
the prices pj the quantities qj cannot be associated with a strictly higher expen-
diture level than qi.
Lemma 2 states that if a collective rationalization of the set of observations S
is possible, then there exists a set of feasible personalized prices and quantities
 S that is consistent with the rules (i)–(iv). To recall, Lemma 1 states that ifCOLLECTIVE HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION 561
qiR0qj (or, equivalently, p 
iqi ≥ p 
iqj) then for any speciﬁcation of the set  S we
must have qiR1
0 qj or qiR2





iqj ⇒  qiR
1
0 qj or  qiR
2
0 qj  (3.3)
Using this, we can specify restrictions on the relations R1
0 and R2
0 in terms of
the set of observations S, that is, without explicit reference to a set of feasible
personalized prices and quantities  S. If there does not exist a speciﬁcation of
the relations R1
0 and R2
0, and corresponding transitive closures R1 and R2 that
are consistent with (3.3) and at the same time meet rules (i)–(iv) in Lemma 2,
then a collective rationalization of the set of observations S is impossible. Al-
ternatively, a necessary condition for a collective rationalization of the set S
to be possible is that there exists a speciﬁcation of R
m
0 and Rm (m = 1 2) that
is consistent with (3.3) and rules (i)–(iv) in Lemma 2. This idea underlies our
testable necessity condition for collective rationality that is expressed directly
in terms of the set of observations S of aggregate prices and quantities; the
condition essentially combines the results in Lemmas 1 and 2.
Toformalizetheidea,weintroducesomeadditionalnotation.First,referring
to (3.3), for p 
iqi ≥ p 
iqj we use qiH1
0qj if we hypothesize qiR1
0 qj and use qiH2
0qj
if we hypothesize qiR2




prices and quantities S that satisﬁes the conditions in Proposition 1 implies that
there exist relations H
m
0 and Hm consistent with the analogues of rules (i)–(iv)
in Lemma 2.
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose that there exists a pair of utility functions U1 and U2
that provide a collective rationalization of the set of observations S ={ (pj;qj);
j = 1     T}. Then there exist hypothetical relations H
m
0 and Hm for each mem-
ber m ∈{ 1 2} such that:
(i) if p 








0 ql     qzH
m
0 qj for some (possibly empty) sequence
(k l     z), then qiHmqj;
(iii) if p 
iqi ≥ p 
iqj and qjHmqi, then qiH
l
0qj (with m  = l);
(iv) if p 
iqi ≥ p 
i(qj1 +qj2) and qj1Hmqi, then qiH
l
0qj2 (with m  = l);
(v) if qi1H1qj and qi2H2qj, then p 
jqj ≤ p 
j(qi1 +qi2);
(vi) if qiH1qj and qiH2qj, then p 
jqj ≤ p 
jqi.
The intuition of the different rules follows immediately from our discussion
of Lemmas 1 and 2 when replacing the relations R
m
0 and Rm by their hypothet-
ical counterparts H
m
0 and Hm. More speciﬁcally, rule (i) refers to the result in
Lemma 1. Rule (ii) deﬁnes the transitive closures H1 and H2 of the relations
H1
0 and H2
0 (compare with Deﬁnition 4). Finally, rules (iii)–(vi) comply with
rules (i)–(iv) in Lemma 2.
To illustrate the proposition, we recapture our Example 1.562 L. CHERCHYE, B. DE ROCK, AND F. VERMEULEN
EXAMPLE 1—Continued: The ﬁrst step of our argument in Example 1 per-
tains to rule (i) in Proposition 2. Speciﬁcally, we can rephrase (3.1) in terms of
the hypothetical relations H1
0 and H2
0 as



















Rule (v) in Proposition 2 then requires p 
2q2 ≤ p 
2(q1 + q3), and this upper cost
bound condition is not met by this set of observations. A similar inconsistency
result holds for any other speciﬁcation of the hypothetical relations H
m
0 and
Hm (m = 1 2): one can verify that any such speciﬁcation that is consistent
with rules (i)–(iv) cannot meet the corresponding upper cost bound conditions
(v) and (vi).
Interestingly, Example 1 implies that it is sufﬁcient to have three goods and
three observations for rejecting collective rationality of observed household
behavior. The following proposition states that this is also necessary.
PROPOSITION 3: There do not always exist utility functions U1 and U2 that
provide a collective rationalization of the set of observations S ={ (pj;qj);j =
1     T} if and only if (i) the number of goods n ≥ 3 and (ii) the number of
observations T ≥ 3.
We only sketch the basic idea for the necessity result.7 First, consider that
there are only two goods (n = 2) and T (≥2) observations. In that case, a col-
lective rationalization of the set of observations S is always achieved for the
following speciﬁcation of feasible personalized prices and quantities (for (x)e
the eth entry of the vector x):
∀j  p
1







j)1 = (qj)1 and (q
2
j)2 = (qj)2 
Inwords,goods1and2areallocatedexclusivelyto,respectively,member1and
member 2; for each observation j we have ( p1
j)  qj = (pj)1(qj)1 and ( p2
j)  qj =
(pj)2(qj)2. It is easily veriﬁed that this speciﬁcation of the feasible personalized
quantities obtains consistency with the nonparametric conditions (ii) and (iii)
in Proposition 1.
7The following arguments concentrate on n = 2( f o rT ≥ 2) and on T = 2( f o rn ≥ 2). If the
necessity result holds in these cases, then it certainly also holds for n<2a n dT<2.COLLECTIVE HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION 563
Next, consider that there are only two observations (T = 2) and n (≥2)
goods. In that case, a collective rationalization of the set of observations S
is always achieved for
p
1




j = 0 for j = 1 2;
q
1




1 = 0)a n dq
2




2 = 0) 
In words, members 1 and 2 are the dictators in, respectively, observation 1 (as
q1
1 = q1 and ( p1
1)  q1 = p 
1q1) and observation 2 (as q2
2 = q2 and ( p2
2)  q2 = p 
2q2).
Again, it is easy to verify consistency with conditions (ii) and (iii) in Proposi-
tion 1 for this speciﬁcation of the feasible personalized prices and quantities.
Thus, the collective model can be rejected (or empirical testing is meaning-
ful) as soon as there are at least three goods and three observations. Note that
the lower bound of three goods is below the lower bound derived by Brown-
ing and Chiappori (1998) in their parametric setting: empirical falsiﬁcation of
their collective model necessitates at least ﬁve goods, because they focus on
pseudo-Slutsky symmetry, which requires at least ﬁve goods for testable impli-
cations. By contrast, their parametric model equally needs only three goods to
test pseudo-Slutsky negativity.8
To conclude, because the necessary condition in Proposition 2 requires only
aggregate prices pj and quantities qj, it enables an operational collective ra-
tionality test that applies to the general case of T observations. The Appen-
dix presents a ﬁnite algorithm for verifying the condition and contains some
further discussion regarding the practicality of the approach. Of course, this
algorithm also applies to any subset of the set of observations S, thus implying
weaker collective rationality tests.
4. TESTABLE SUFFICIENCY RESTRICTIONS
Although the condition in Proposition 2 is necessary for a collective ratio-
nalization, it is in general not sufﬁcient.9 This follows from Example 2,w h i c h
contains data that satisfy the condition but cannot be collectively rationalized
in the sense of Proposition 1.
EXAMPLE 2: We prove in the Appendix that a collective rationalization can-
not be obtained for a set of seven observations with




iqj for all j ∈{ 1     7}\{i} 
8We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
9In fact, it can be veriﬁed that the necessary condition in Proposition 2 is also sufﬁcient for
T ≤ 4 (for compactness, we abstract from a formal statement). Although Example 2 uses T = 7
for mathematical elegance of the proof, it is worth stressing that similar (but less elegant) argu-
ments can be established for 4 <T<7.564 L. CHERCHYE, B. DE ROCK, AND F. VERMEULEN




i(qj +qk) for all j k ∈{ 1     7}\{i}
with j  = k 




i(qj +qk)−ε for all j k ∈{ 1     7}\{i}
with j  = k 
where (mini e(pi)emini e(qi)e)/6 >ε>0( i ∈{ 1     7} and e ∈{ 1     n}). For
example, such a structure applies to qi pi ∈  7 with
∀i ∈{ 1     7} ( qi)i = 3a n d(qi)e = 1i fe  = i 
∀i ∈{ 1 7} ( pi)i = 11 and (pi)e = 1i fe  = i 
∀i ∈{ 2     6} ( pi)i = 10−ε and (pi)e = 1i fe  = i 
where (1/6)>ε>0.
We next present a sufﬁcient condition for a collective rationalization that
solely uses observed (aggregate) prices and quantities. Essentially, as com-
pared to the necessary condition in Proposition 2, this sufﬁcient condition
requires some additional structure in these prices and quantities, so that we
can always conceive a household decision model (and corresponding feasible
personalized prices and quantities) consistent with the collective rationality
restrictions in Proposition 1; we explain the particular decision model subse-
quently. Like before, this condition implies (in casu sufﬁciency) tests for collec-
tive rationality that hold for the general case of T observations. A ﬁnite testing
algorithm is presented in the Appendix.
PROPOSITION 4: Suppose that for the set of observations S ={ (pj;qj);j =
1     T} there exist hypothetical relations H
m
0 and Hm for each member m ∈
{1 2} that satisfy rules (i)–(vi) in Proposition 2 and, in addition, allow for con-
structing sets S1 and S2 with S1 ⊆ S and S2 = S\S1 such that
(vii) Sm ={ (pj;qj) ∈ S | p 
jqj ≤ p 
jqi whenever qiHmqj};
(viii) for each (pi;qi), (pj;qj) ∈ Sm, qiH
m
0 qj whenever p 
iqi ≥ p 
iqj.
Then there exists a pair of utility functions U1 and U2 that provide a collective
rationalization of the set S.
Referring to the interpretation of the unitary model as a dictatorship model
(see Section 2), we can interpret this result in terms of a situation-dependent
dictatorship model. Speciﬁcally, we prove in the Appendix that under condi-
tions (i)–(viii) we can obtain consistency with the nonparametric condition (ii)
in Proposition 1 for the following speciﬁcation of the feasible personalized
quantities and prices:
if (pj;qj) ∈ S
1  then q
1
j = qj;COLLECTIVE HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION 565
if (pj;qj) ∈ S









j = 0 for all (pj;qj) ∈ S 
For all observations j such that (pj;qj) ∈ S1, member 1 is the dictator because
q1
j = qj (or, equivalently, q2
j = qh
j = 0)a n d( p1
j)  qj = p 
jqj. Similarly, member 2
is the dictator for the other observations.10 Put another way, the identity of the
dictator depends on the observation or situation at hand. In that interpretation,
the statement qiH1qj means that the (situation-dependent) dictator 1 prefers
the (aggregate) qi over qj; a directly similar interpretation holds for qiH2qj.
Rule (vii) then speciﬁes that the situation-dependent dictators 1 and 2 must
respect the corresponding upper cost bounds. The additional rule (viii) indi-
cates that if member m (1 or 2) is the dictator in situations i and j, then the
choice of qi when qj was equally obtainable under the prices pi can be ratio-
nalized only if member m prefers (aggregate) qi over qj (or qiH
m
0 qj).
This situation-dependent dictatorship model can be regarded as a direct
“collective” extension of the unitary decision model. Speciﬁcally, in contrast
to the latter model, the former model implies two separate decision makers
in the household, who are each (fully) responsible for a disjoint subset of the
T observed aggregate quantities. Consequently, the sufﬁciency condition im-
plies that there must exist a partitioning of the observed set S into two subsets
that each individually meet the unitary GARP; that is, each individual dictator
must act consistent with the unitary rationality condition for those quantities for
which she or he is (fully) responsible. It is this interpretation that underlies the
testing algorithm in the Appendix.
In summary, violation of the necessary condition in Proposition 2 means that
a collective rationalization is impossible, while consistency with the sufﬁcient
condition in Proposition 4 entails the opposite conclusion. As for data that
meet the necessity but not the sufﬁciency condition, we cannot directly tell
from the observed (aggregate) prices and quantities whether a collective ratio-
nalization of the data is effectively possible.11 For instance, the proof of the in-
consistency result in Example 2 starts from the necessity condition (which, like
10We note that, technically, this speciﬁcation of the feasible personalized quantities and prices
is consistent with ∞ >µ j > 0f o ra l lj (see Section 4 of Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen
(2007) for details). An interpretation in terms of bargaining power is as follows (for the given
speciﬁcation of the personalized prices): for (pj;qj) ∈ S1, the value of the bargaining weight µj
(>0) of member 2 is too small to obtain q1
j  = qj; conversely, for (pj;qj) ∈ S2,t h ev a l u eo fµj
(<∞)i st o ol a r g et oo b t a i nq2
j  = qj. Furthermore, we stress that the given speciﬁcation of the
feasible personalized prices and quantities should not be the unique one that obtains consistency
with condition (ii) in Proposition 1 (and, thus, other interpretations of the sufﬁciency result are
equally possible).
11At this point, it is worth emphasizing the subtle difference between collective rationality of
household behavior and a collective rationalization of a set of household observations S.O nt h e
one hand, impossibility of a collective rationalization of S (e.g., inconsistency with the necessity
condition in Proposition 2) necessarily implies collectively irrational behavior. On the other hand,566 L. CHERCHYE, B. DE ROCK, AND F. VERMEULEN
the unitary GARP, focuses on the full consumption bundles) to subsequently
consider the construction of feasible personalized prices and quantities for in-
dividual goods. Such practice generally boils down to checking the inequalities
in Proposition 1 that are nonlinear in these feasible personalized prices and
quantities. (We avoid this in our proof of the result in Example 2 only because
of our speciﬁc condition for ε.)
Still, even though the necessary condition should not generally coincide
with the sufﬁcient condition, we may expect the two conditions to become
equally powerful (or to converge) when the sample size increases.12 Speciﬁ-
cally, for each observation j we have that minqi{p 
jqi|qiH1qj and not qiH2qj} or
minqi{p 
jqi|qiH2qj and not qiH1qj} will generally get closer to zero for larger T.
Hence, the requirement p 
jqj ≤ p 
j(qi1 + qi2) whenever qi1H1qj and qi2H2qj
in Proposition 2 (rule (v)) will approach the condition p 
jqj ≤ p 
jqi whenever
qiHmqj for m = 1 or 2 in Proposition 4 (rule (vii)).13
The associated convergence rate will then of course depend (positively) on
the variation in the observed prices and quantities, and hence we may expect it
to increase with the number of goods. For a given number of goods, the speed
ofconvergencewillvarywiththespeciﬁcdatageneratingprocessthatunderlies
the aggregate prices and quantities, which in turn depends on the household
member utilities and on the characteristics of the within-household bargain-
ing process. However, in general, we can safely argue that the empirical im-
plications of the fairly rudimentary situation-dependent dictatorship solution
(see the sufﬁcient condition) will get closer to those of any more reﬁned intra-
household decision process (see the necessary condition) when the sample size
increases.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
To conclude, we recall that the collective model under study considers gen-
eral member-speciﬁc preferences and assumes only that the empirical analyst
observes the aggregate household consumption quantities and prices. Attrac-
tively, the model encompasses a large variety of alternative behavioral models
as special cases, which include additional prior information that implies ex-
tra restrictions regarding the feasible personalized quantities and prices (see
possibility of a collective rationalization of S (e.g., consistency with the sufﬁciency condition in
Proposition 4) does not necessarily imply collectively rational behavior; it only means that we
cannot reject collective rationality on the basis of the available set of observations.
12See, for example, Bronars (1987) for power notions in the context of nonparametric ratio-
nality tests.
13Note that the necessary condition (rule (vi)) and the sufﬁcient condition (rule (vii)) both
require p 
jqj ≤ p 
jqi whenever qiH1qj and qiH2qj. Also observe that the empirical restrictions
that follow from rule (iv) in Proposition 2 imply those of rule (viii) in Proposition 4 when, for
each observation j,m i n qi{p 
jqi|qiH1qj and not qiH2qj} or minqi{p 
jqi|qiH2qj and not qiH1qj} gets
close to zero for large T.COLLECTIVE HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION 567
(2.1)a n d( 2.2) for the general model under study). For example, such ad-
ditional structure may pertain to observability of private and/or public con-
sumption quantities or to the nature of the individual members’ preferences
(namely, egoistic rather than altruistic). Notable cases are the traditional uni-
tarymodel and the collective model of Chiappori(1988).For each of these spe-
cial cases, we may expect more stringent testable necessary and sufﬁcient con-
ditions for collective rationalization that solely use observed prices and quan-
tities. (These conditions can be obtained along similar lines as in the proofs
of Propositions 2 and 4. The associated testing algorithms can proceed in the
same way as those presented in the Appendix.)
As a ﬁnal note, we recall that the testable collective rationality conditions in
Propositions 2 and 4 have a structure analogous to the (unitary) GARP, which
allows for easy adaptations of the existing power and goodness-of-ﬁt measures
for nonparametric consumption analysis (see, respectively, Bronars (1987)a n d
Varian (1990)). Speciﬁcally, using the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions, one
can generate upper and lower bounds for each of these measures. (If these up-
per and lower bounds are situated close to each other, one possible interpre-
tation is that the empirical content of the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions is
practically the same for the set of observations under study.)
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:V a r i a n( 1982) proved the equivalence between
conditions (ii) and (iii) of the proposition. Therefore, it sufﬁces to prove equiv-
alence between (i) and (iii).14
14This proof generalizes that of Chiappori (1988), who focused on the speciﬁc case of house-
hold labor supply. Another difference is that Chiappori focused on (a strong version of) the strong
axiom of revealed preference (SARP) conditions while our proof uses the (less stringent) GARP
conditions. It is worth pointing out that all our results for the GARP can be adapted to apply for
the (strong) SARP.568 L. CHERCHYE, B. DE ROCK, AND F. VERMEULEN
























Given concavity, both individual utility functions are subdifferentiable,
which carries over to their weighted sum U1 + µjU2.15 An optimal solution to
the above maximization problem must therefore satisfy (for ηj the Lagrange











j (m = 1 2) is a subgradient of the utility function Um deﬁned for the
vector zc ∈  n
+ a n de v a l u a t e da tqc




































Substituting (A.1) into (A.2) and setting U
m
k = Um( qk) (m = 1 2; k = i j)
obtains condition (iii) of the proposition.
(iii) ⇒ (i) Under condition (iii), we can deﬁne for any  q = (q1 q2 qh) such
that p 
j(q1 +q2 +qh) ≤ p 
jqj,
U
1( q) = min








 ( q− qi)] (A.3)
and
U
2( q) = min








 ( q− qi)]  (A.4)
Varian (1982) proved that U1( qj) = U1
j and U2( qj) = U2
j .N e x t ,g i v e n
µj ∈  ++, we have that
U
1( q)+µjU














 ( q− qj)] 
15To be precise, −Um (m = 1 2) is convex and therefore subdifferentiable. This, of course,
does not affect our argument.COLLECTIVE HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION 569













where q = (q1 +q2 +qh).
Because p 
jq ≤ p 
jqj, we thus have
U
1( q)+µjU







which proves that qj maximizes U1( q)+µjU2( q) subject to p 
j(q1 +q2 +qh) ≤
p 
jqj. We conclude that the functions U1 and U2 in (A.3)a n d( A.4)p r o v i d ea
collective rationalization of S. These functions satisfy the conditions in part (i)
of the proposition (compare with Varian (1982)). Q.E.D.
PROOF OF LEMMA 1—Necessity: We ﬁrst derive that qiR0qj implies qiR1
0 qj
or  qiR2
0 qj for any set  S. The result follows from the fact that p 
iqi ≥ p 
iqj (or
qiR0qj) is incompatible with the existence of some  S such that ( p1
i)  qi <(  p1
i)  qj
and ( p2
i)  qi <(  p2
i)  qj. Indeed, summing these last inequalities immediately
yields p 
iqi < p 
iqj.
Sufﬁciency: We next derive that if, for all sets of feasible personalized prices
and quantities S, qiR1
0 qj or qiR2
0 qj, then qiR0qj. The result is obtained by noting
that p 
iqi < p 
iqj implies ( p1
i)  qi + ( p2
i)  qi <(  p1
i)  qj + ( p2
i)  qj for all  S. It is then
easy to see that if p 
iqi < p 
iqj, then there exists  S such that ( p1
i)  qi <(  p1
i)  qj
and ( p2
i)  qi <(  p2
i)  qj (i.e., we have neither qiR1
0 qj nor qiR2
0 qj); for example, one
may use p1
k = (1/2)pk and q1
k = qk (k = i j). Hence, we have for all sets  S that
 qiR1
0 qj or qiR2
0 qj only if p 
iqi ≥ p 
iqj, that is, qiR0qj. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2: Given that a collective rationalization of the set of
observations S is possible, we consider a set  S that is consistent with condi-
tion (ii) in Proposition 1. Using Deﬁnition 4, this set  S deﬁnes relations R
m
0
and Rm (m = 1 2). We will show that these relations satisfy rules (i)–(iv) in
Lemma 2.
As for rule (i), we establish that if p 
iqi ≥ p 
iqj and  qjR1 qi, then  qiR2
0 qj (the
argument for the other case is directly analogous). For qjR1 qi, consistency with
condition (ii) in Proposition 1 requires ( p1
i)  qi ≤ ( p1
i)  qj. Given p 
iqi ≥ p 
iqj, this
last inequality implies ( p2
i)  qi ≥ ( p2
i)  qj or qiR2
0 qj, which gives the result.
To derive rule (ii), suppose that p 
iqi ≥ p 
i(qj1 + qj2) in combination with
 qj1R1 qi while not  qiR2
0 qj2. On the one hand, not  qiR2
0 qj2 means that ( p2
i)  qi <
( p2
i)  qj2. On the other hand, qj1R1 qi requires that ( p1
i)  qi ≤ ( p1
i)  qj1 for the con-
sistency with condition (ii) in Proposition 1. Combining these two inequalities
would imply p 
iqi <(  p1
i)  qj1 + ( p2
i)  qj2 ≤ p 
i(qj1 + qj2), which contradicts p 
iqi ≥
p 
i(qj1 +qj2). Thus, we conclude that (p 
iqi ≥ p 
i(qj1 +qj2)∧ qj1R1 qi) ⇒ qiR2
0 qj2.
A directly analogous argument holds for the other case.570 L. CHERCHYE, B. DE ROCK, AND F. VERMEULEN
As for rules (iii) and (iv), under  qi1R1 qj and  qi2R2 qj consistency with con-
dition (ii) in Proposition 1 is obtained only if ( p1
j)  qj ≤ ( p1
j)  qi1 and ( p2
j)  qj ≤
( p2
j)  qi2. This last result immediately yields p 
jqj ≤ ( p1
j)  qi1 + ( p2
j)  qi2 ≤ p 
j(qi1 +
qi2) if qi1  = qi2 and, similarly, p 
jqj ≤ p 
jqi if qi1 = qi2 = qi. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: The result follows immediately from combining
Lemmas 1 and 2, replacing the relations R
m
0 and Rm with their hypothetical
counterparts H
m
0 and Hm. Rule (i) follows from Lemma 1. Rule (ii) deﬁnes the
transitive closures H1 and H2 of the relations H1
0 and H2
0; compare with Deﬁ-
nition 4. Finally, rules (iii)–(vi) follow from rules (i)–(iv) in Lemma 2. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF THE RESULT IN EXAMPLE 2: For the speciﬁc data structure, con-
sistencywiththeconditioninProposition2impliesthatthereexisthypothetical
relations that must satisfy, for all i j ∈{ 1     7}, i  = j, qiHmqj and not qiHlqj
for m  = l; and we cannot have qiH1qk and qjH2qk for k ∈{ 1 7} and for all




∀i j ∈{ 1     7} ( i > j ⇒ qjH
1qi) and (i < j ⇒ qjH
2qi) 
Combining the corresponding requirements that follow from condition (ii)
in Proposition 1 obtains, for all i ∈{ 2     6} and j ∈{ 1     7},
(i > j ⇒ p
 
iqj −ε ≤ ( p
1
i)
  qj ≤ p
 
iqj) and (i < j ⇒ 0 ≤ ( p
1
i)
  qj ≤ ε)  (A.5)
Next, because (qj)e = (q1
j)e+(q2
j)e+(qh
j )e and pc
i ≤ pi (c = 1 2 h), we obtain
that p 
iqj −ε ≤ ( p1
i)  qj ≤ p 








j)e ≤ (pi)e(qj)e 









i)e ≤ (pi)e 
Similarly, the restriction 0 ≤ ( p1






















16The following argument can be repeated for any alternative speciﬁcation of the relations Hm
0
and Hm that meets the necessity condition in Proposition 2.COLLECTIVE HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION 571
Let us concentrate on e = 1 and consider 0 <σ= minj∈{1     7} e∈{1     n}(qj)e.
The pigeon hole principle implies ∀j ∈{ 1     7} that ∃cj ∈{ 1 2 h}, (q
cj
j )1 ≥
(σ/3), so that we get
[p
 
iqj −ε ≤ ( p
1
i)










i )1 ≤ (pi)1

and
[0 ≤ ( p
1
i)
  qj ≤ ε]⇒












σ . Using this,
the preference structure in (A.5)o b t a i n s ,∀i ∈{ 2     6},
∀j1 j 2 ∈{ 1     7} ( i > j 1 ∧i<j 2 ⇒ cj1  = cj2); (A.6)









σ ), which excludes cj1 = cj2. Inconsistency with the collective
rationalization conditions in Proposition 1 follows because (A.6) implies
cj1  = cj2 for all j1 j 2 ∈{ 1 3 5 7} j 1  = j2; and this contradicts cj ∈{ 1 2 h}
∀j ∈{ 1     7}. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: Suppose that we can construct sets S1 and S2 in
Proposition 4. Then we can construct a set of feasible prices and quantities  S
that meets condition (ii) in Proposition 1. Speciﬁcally, deﬁne  S such that
if (pj;qj) ∈ S
1  then q
1





if (pj;qj) ∈ S
2  then q
2











j = 0 for all (pj;qj) ∈ S 
We restrict attention to household member 1, but a directly analogous rea-
soning applies to member 2. Condition (ii) in Proposition 1 states that ( p1
i)  qi ≥
( p1
i)  qk     (  p1
z)  qz ≥ ( p1
z)  qj for some (possibly empty) sequence (k     z)
implies ( p1
j)  qj ≤ ( p1
j)  qi. As a preliminary step, we note that under the pre-
ceding speciﬁcation of the set  S we have for all (pl1;ql1) ∈ S1 that ( p1
l1)  ql2 = 0
if (pl2;ql2) ∈ S2. This mean that the only interesting case is (pl;ql) ∈ S1 for all
l = i j k     z. Hence, obtaining ( p1
i)  qi ≥ ( p1
i)  qk     (  p1
z)  qz ≥ ( p1
z)  qj ⇒
( p1
j)  qj ≤ ( p1
j)  qi boils down to verifying p 
iqi ≥ p 
iqk     p 
zqz ≥ p 
zqj ⇒ p 
jqj ≤
p 
jqi for any possible sequence of (i k     z j) with (pl;ql) ∈ S1 for all l =
i j k     z.572 L. CHERCHYE, B. DE ROCK, AND F. VERMEULEN
Using rule (viii) in Proposition 4,w eh a v ep 
iqi ≥ p 
iqk     p 
zqz ≥ p 
zqj ⇒
qiH1
0qk     qzH1
0qj, which in turn implies qiH1qj. Rule (vii) in Proposition 4
consequently guarantees p 
jqj ≤ p 
jqi, that is, condition (ii) in Proposition 1 is
met for member 1. Q.E.D.
Testing Algorithms
We ﬁrst present an algorithm for checking the necessary condition for a col-
lective rationalization of the set of observations S in Proposition 2. Before doing
so, we introduce some additional notation. First, we deﬁne the set
Dj ={ (qi;pi)|qiR0qj} 
Next, we use the notion that every speciﬁcation of the hypothetical relations
H1
0 and H2
0 (and the corresponding transitive closures H1 and H2) deﬁnes the













rather than the relations H
m
0 and Hm:
Step 1: For all j ∈{ 1     T}, construct the set Dj and set Cj =∅ . (Each set





0 that the algorithm considers in the successive iterations.)









Cj.I ff o ra n yj such (D1
j D 2
j) does not exist, then STOP the algorithm: a col-
lective rationalization of the set S is impossible.





j) using Warshall’s algorithm (Varian (1982, p. 949)).
Step 4: For j = 1     T, verify rule (iii) in Proposition 2. If OK, then go to
j +1u n l e s sj = T, in which case then go to Step 5;e l s e( a )Cj = Cj ∪(D1
j D 2
j) 
(b) go to Step 2.
Step 5: For j = 1     T, verify rule (iv) Proposition 2. If OK, then go to j+1









j). If OK, then go to j +1u n l e s sj = T, in which case then
STOP the algorithm—the set S meets the necessary condition for a collective
rationalization;e l s e( a )Cj = Cj ∪(D1
j D 2
j), (b) go to Step 2.COLLECTIVE HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION 573
Thisalgorithmisclearlyﬁniteinnatureandisontheorderof 3|D1|+|D2|+···+|DT|.
Speciﬁcally, for any (qi;pi) ∈ Dj we must (maximally) consider three pos-
sibilities: (qi;pi) ∈ D1
j (qi;pi) ∈ D2
j,a n d(qi;pi) ∈ D1
j ∩ D2
j. For each j ∈
{1     T}, this gives us 3
|Dj| possible speciﬁcations of the sets Dm
j .W eh a v e
3|D1|+|D2|+···+|DT| ≤ 3T2 for T observations, which gives us a ﬁnite upper bound
for the number of speciﬁcations to be checked. (Hence, the upper bound 3T2
applies only if Dj = S for all observations j, which is of course an extreme
scenario.)
We next consider the sufﬁcient condition for a collective rationalization of the
set of observations S in Proposition 4. This condition can be checked by means
of the following algorithm:
Step 1: For the given set S,d e ﬁ n eS∗ ={ (S1 S2)|S1 ⊆ S and S2 = S\S1}.( T h e
set S∗ captures all possible speciﬁcations of S1 and S2.)
Step 2: For (S1 S2) ∈ S∗ verify GARP for S1 and S2 (separately). If OK for
some (S1 S2) ∈ S∗, then STOP the algorithm—a collective rationalization of the
set S is possible. If not OK for any (S1 S2) ∈ S∗, then STOP the algorithm—the
set S does not meet the sufﬁcient condition for a collective rationalization.
Again, this algorithm is ﬁnite in nature: we maximally have to consider all
possible subsets of S  which is exactly of magnitude 2T for T observations.
To conclude, it is worth stressing that strategies exist that considerably en-
hance the computational efﬁciency of the testing algorithms. For example,
Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2005) showed that one may exclude from
the testing exercise observations that are not involved in a (unitary) GARP-
violating sequence of observations. In addition, they suggest so-called mutually
independent subsets of observations for which the tests may be carried out sep-
arately. Finally, for each subset of, say, k (≤T) observations, one can exploit
that a collective rationalization is possible for the ﬁrst l (≤k) observations only
ifitispossiblefortheﬁrstl−1 observations.Hence,onemaysuccessivelyapply
the testing algorithms to larger l (starting from l = 3), while each time respect-
ing the feasibility restrictions associated with the (preceding) l − 1c a s e( i . e . ,
regarding possible speciﬁcations (D1
j D 2
j) for the necessity test and (S1 S2) for
the sufﬁciency test). We refer to Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2005)
for a more detailed discussion on the practicality of the tests, including an il-
lustrative application to real-life data.
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